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Abstract 
Perceiving the body influences how we perceive and respond to stimuli in the world.  We 
investigated the respective effects of different components of bodily representation – the senses 
of ownership and agency – on responses to simple visual stimuli.  Participants viewed a video 
image of their hand on a computer monitor presented either in real time, or with a systematic 
delay.  Blocks began with an induction period in which the index finger was (1) brushed, (2) 
passively moved, or (3) actively moved by the participant.  Subjective reports showed that the 
sense of ownership over the seen hand emerged with synchronous video, regardless of the type 
of induction, whereas the sense of agency over the hand emerged only following synchronous 
video with active movement.  Following induction, participants responded as quickly as possible 
to the onset of visual stimuli near the hand by pressing a button with their other hand.  Reaction 
time was significantly speeded when participants had a sense of agency over their seen hand.  
This effect was eliminated when participants responded vocally, suggesting that it reflects 
priming of manual responses, rather than enhanced stimulus detection.  These results suggest that 
vision of one’s own hand – and, specifically, the sense of agency over that hand – primes manual 
motor responses. 
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Sense of Agency Primes Manual Motor Responses 
 
 The body is a salient object in the visual world (cf. Gibson 1979).  What are the 
perceptual and cognitive effects of the visual experience of our own body?  Studies in both 
patients with visual extinction (di Pellegrino and Frassinetti 2000) and in healthy participants 
(Reed et al 2006) have demonstrated attentional enhancement of the space immediately 
surrounding a viewed hand.  These effects are not merely spatial, but are specifically linked to 
the body, since responses to visual stimuli appearing on or near the hand are facilitated compared 
to those appearing on a non-hand object (Hari and Jousmäki 1996; Tipper et al 1998; Whiteley et 
al 2004; Whiteley et al 2008).  Furthermore, seeing the hand has specific effects on touch, 
speeding reaction time (RT) to tactile stimuli (e.g., Tipper et al 1998), and improving tactile 
acuity (e.g., Kennett et al 2001).  It is presently unclear, however, what aspect of seeing the body 
causes such effects. 
The experience of having a body is not monolithic, but is composed of numerous 
dissociable components (cf. Longo et al 2008).  The most common dissociation made between 
components of the bodily self is that between the sense of ownership over one’s own body (i.e., 
the sense that it’s ‘mine’), and the sense of agency over it (i.e., the sense that I can control my 
body) (Gallagher 2000; Longo et al 2008; Tsakiris et al 2006).  One paradigm used recently to 
investigate such issues is the rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which a prosthetic hand touched 
synchronously with the participant’s own hand creates the illusion that the rubber hand is 
actually theirs (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).  An analogous illusion 
can be created by a video image of the participant’s own hand displayed either in real-time, or 
with a systematic delay (Tsakiris et al 2006).  In such situations, viewing both active and passive 
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movements generates a sense of ownership over the viewed hand, but only viewing one’s own 
active movements produces a sense of agency.  That is, comparing the effects of active and 
passive movements of the participants’ fingers can shed light on the components of self-
representation.  Specifically, the sense of ownership results from synchronous – but not 
asynchronous – video feedback of one’s own hand, irrespective of whether the hand is touched, 
passively moved, or actively moved.  The sense of agency, in contrast, results during 
synchronous – but, again, not asynchronous – video feedback, but only when the finger is 
actively moved.  Tsakiris et al (2006) validated the use of this paradigm as a manipulation of 
ownership and agency by showing that these aspects of the bodily self induced distinct patterns 
of proprioceptive biases in the RHI.  Whereas the sense of ownership induced a local 
proprioceptive displacement towards the video image that was confined to the stimulated finger, 
the sense of agency induced a more widespread global shift of the entire hand. 
Thus, it is known that seeing the body has cognitive effects, and also that the 
representation of the body is composed of dissociable components.  Which of these components 
is responsible for cognitive effects of seeing one’s own body?  Many experimental designs show 
an effect of self-representation on basic sensorimotor processing, but cannot reveal whether 
ownership or agency is responsible (Tsakiris et al 2007).  We recently used the RHI to 
investigate the role of ownership in the enhancement of tactile acuity from seeing one’s hand 
(Longo et al in press-a).  Participants observed the same rubber hand in each condition, but 
tactile enhancement effects were observed only when participants experienced a sense of 
ownership over the rubber hand.  Similarly, Whiteley and colleagues (2008) used the video RHI 
paradigm to investigate the role of ownership in the enhancement of visual detection of object on 
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one’s own hand.  Detection of visual stimuli on the hand was significantly faster than detection 
on an inanimate object only when participants had a sense of ownership over the hand. 
These results suggest that the sense of ownership facilitates sensory processing.  The 
potential effects of agency, however, are presently unknown.  The present study investigated two 
main questions: (1) what are the effects of ownership and agency over a seen hand on processing 
of simple visual stimuli appearing near that hand; (2) do such effects reflect facilitation of 
sensory or of motor processing?  Ownership and agency were manipulated using the video RHI 
paradigm described above.  Effects of ownership can be investigated by comparing synchronous 
and asynchronous video feedback conditions, independent of whether the induction is tactile, or 
involves passive or active movement.  Effects of agency, in contrast, are expected only following 
synchronous feedback of active movements, but not passive movements or touch. 
This paradigm also allows potential effects on sensory or on motor processing to be 
dissociated.  Sensory effects would be expected to be faster when stimuli appear near the hand 
than farther away, given the known attentional advantage for stimuli appearing in peripersonal 
space (e.g., di Pellegrino and Frassinetti 2000; Reed et al 2006), and also to be independent of 
the response effector.  If, in contrast, bodily representations prime motor responses, no 
modulation would be expected as a function of the location of the visual stimulus, but priming 
might be expected to be specific to the seen effector (in this case, the hand). 
Method 
Participants 
 Fourty-four volunteers (28 female, age 18-34) participated.  Thirty were right-handed as 
assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield 1971), M =, 74.97, range: -50 – 100.  Participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision, and were paid for their participation.  Twenty-four 
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participated in the main experiment with manual responses, and twenty in a control experiment 
with vocal responses.  Data from an additional participant was excluded due to experimenter 
error.  Procedures were approved by the local ethical committee. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 The experimental setup is shown in Figure 1.  Stimuli were displayed on a 15” flat-panel 
monitor using LabView 7.0 software (National Instruments, Austin, TX).  Participants sat with 
their head approximately 30 cm from the monitor and placed either their right or left hand behind 
the monitor.  A mirror was attached to the back of the monitor and the mirror image of the hand 
was recorded by a colour video camera (Sony CCD-V800E) recording at 28 Hz.  This video 
image was displayed on the monitor either with minimal delay (synchronous condition) or 
systematically delayed (asynchronous condition).  In the synchronous condition, the minimal and 
irreducible delay was approximately 100 ms, while that in the asynchronous condition was 
approximately 500 ms.  Franck et al (2001) found that healthy adults perceived a viewed action 
as self-generated at delays up to 150 ms, suggesting that the 100 ms delay should not adversely 
affect illusion of ownership and agency (cf. Blakemore et al 1999). 
Participants responded to illumination of small green lights, 1 cm (1.91˚) in diameter, 
spaced 5.75 cm (10.95˚) apart.  A fixation cross was placed midway between the lights. 
Design and Procedure 
There were 12 experimental blocks, formed by crossing the three methods of inducing 
ownership (active movement, passive movement, tactile stimulation), the two levels of 
synchrony (synchronous, asynchronous), and whether the right or the left hand was used to 
respond.  Order of blocks was randomized for each participant.  On each block, participants 
placed either their left or right hand behind the monitor.  They wore a black smock which 
Agency and Motor Facilitation 
 7 
covered their arm such that it was not visible directly, but only indirectly as a video image 
relayed from the camera to the monitor.  The table was covered with black felt.  Four bumps on 
the table which could be felt – but not seen - indicated where to place the tips of the index and 
little fingers of each hand. 
Each block began with a 60 second RHI induction period.  In the active condition, 
participants were instructed to lift and lower their index finger at their own pace. They were 
instructed to move approximately every 1-2 s, but not rhythmically.  In the passive condition, the 
participant’s index finger was lifted and lowered by the experimenter pulling on an invisible 
thread attached to the finger.  The finger was lifted approximately once every one to two 
seconds, but not rhythmically.  In the tactile condition, the participant’s index finger was brushed 
by the experimenter with a paintbrush approximately once every one to two seconds, but not 
rhythmically.  Following the induction period, participants were instructed to fixate the cross and 
the experimental trials commenced. 
For the manual response group, responses were made with the hand that was not being 
viewed by pressing a mouse button with the index finger as quickly as possible.  For half the 
participants, both lights were always visible, and the imperative stimulus was a change in 
illumination of one of the lights from grey to bright green.  For the other half, the imperative 
stimulus was the abrupt appearance of one of the lights, fully illuminated.  The lights appeared 
on either the left or right side of the fixation cross.  Depending on whether the right or the left 
hand was the stimulus, one of the lights was always immediately above (but not touching) the tip 
of the viewed index finger, while the other was farther away in empty space (see Figure 1).  The 
light remained on until a response was recorded, at which time it turned off/disappeared 
immediately.  
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For the vocal response group, the participant’s task was to say “ta” as quickly as possible 
into a headset-mounted microphone.  Twelve participants responded to the appearance of a light, 
eight to the illumination of a light.  The vocal response was recorded and reaction times were 
computed offline in Matlab 7.3 (Mathworks, Natick, MA) by finding the first point where the 
absolute value of the amplitude reached half of its maximum value.  To allow sufficient time for 
vocal responses, a constant trial length of 3,000 ms was used.  All other procedures were 
identical to the manual response condition. 
Trials were separated by an interval between 1,000 and 3,000 ms, randomly selected on 
each trial.  There were 60 trials in each block, for a total of 720 trials.  For manual responses, 
trials on which RT was faster than 200 ms or slower than 500 ms were excluded (5.9%).  As 
vocal responses were slower on average, a 600 ms upper bound on RT was used, which produced 
a similar exclusion rate (6.2%). 
Eleven participants in the vocal response group additionally completed a subjective 
report questionnaire following the main experiment.  For each questionnaire item, participants 
were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with 10 statements concerning their 
experience during the various conditions.  Responses were made using a 7-point Likert scale, 
where a score of +3 indicated strong agreement with the statement, -3 strong disagreement with 
the statement, and 0 neither agreement nor disagreement.  Judgments for each statement were 
made separately for each of the six conditions formed by crossing the induction type (active 
movement, passive movement, tactile stimulation) and synchrony (synchronous video feedback, 
asynchronous video feedback) factors.  The order of statements was randomized for each 
participant. 
Results 
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Subjective Reports 
 Mean responses to the ten subjective report items are shown in Table 1.  In order to look 
generally at the senses of ownership and agency, we collapsed across items related to each of 
these experiences.  To compute an overall measure of ownership in each condition, we averaged 
across items 1-3, with items 2 and 3 being scored in reverse.  To compute an overall measure of 
agency, we averaged across items 4-6, with item 6 being scored negatively.  Mean values for 
these measures are shown in Figure 2.  An ANOVA performed only on data from the 
synchronous condition revealed a significant main effect of induction type, F(2, 20) = 11.21, p < 
.0005, and a main effect of synchrony, F(1, 10) = 35.24, p < .0001.  There was also a significant 
interaction of induction type and component, F(2, 20) = 6.03, p < .01. 
Significant levels of ownership (i.e., greater than 0, Bonferroni corrected) were observed 
in the synchronous condition following active movement, t(10) = 8.48, p < .0001, passive 
movement, t(10) = 6.66, p < .0001, and touch, t(10) = 4.48, p < .001.  No such effects were 
observed in the asynchronous condition, t(10) = 1.59, .46, .39, respectively.  Significant levels of 
agency, in contrast, were observed only following synchronous active movement, t(10) = 13.54, 
p < .0001, but not following passive movement, t(10) = 1.66, touch, t(10) = 1.81, nor any of the 
asynchronous conditions, t(10) = 2.07, -1.07, -.85.   
Manual Responses 
There was a significant main effect of induction type, F(2, 46) = 4.03, p < .05, and a 
marginal main effect of synchrony, F(1, 46) = 3.35, p = .08.  More interestingly, there was a 
significant interaction of induction type and synchrony, F(2, 46) = 3.30, p < .05 (see Figure 2).  
The interaction was investigated by simple effects testing, holding each factor constant in turn 
and looking for effects of the other factor.  Simple effects showed a significant facilitation of 
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reactions following active movement of the index finger (298 vs. 306 ms), t(23) = 3.49, p < .002, 
which survived Bonferroni correction (see Figure 2).  No such effects were found following 
passive movement (308 vs. 308 ms), t(23) = 0.01, or tactile stimulation (307 vs. 308 ms), t(23) = 
0.50.  This pattern suggests that this speedup in RT is a specific effect of the sense of agency 
over the seen hand, but not the sense of ownership. 
When the synchrony factor was held constant in order to compare differences between 
induction methods in the synchronous condition, RTs were lower in the active movement 
condition than in the passive and tactile synchronous conditions, F(1, 23) = 5.14, p < .05 (see 
Figure 2).  No significant difference was observed, in contrast, between RT in the active 
asynchronous condition and the two other asynchronous conditions, F(1, 23) = 0.47.  This 
pattern demonstrates a clear facilitation effect of agency on RT, rather than an interference or 
distraction effect of asynchronous feedback. 
There was no significant main effect, nor any interactions, involving whether the light 
was near or far from the finger.  Comparable RT advantages following synchronous, compared 
to asynchronous, active movement were observed both when the light appeared near the finger (9 
ms), t(23) = 3.45, p < .005, and when it appeared in empty space (7 ms), t(23) = 2.47, p < .05.  
No such effects were observed following passive movement (-1 ms, 1 ms), t(23) = -0.26, 0.33, or 
tactile stimulation (2 ms, 1 ms), t(23) = 0.60, 0.24.  This pattern suggests that the effect of 
agency reflects a priming of motor responses, rather than an increase in peripersonal space 
representation, which would be expected to be larger in the space immediately surrounding the 
hand. 
 There was also a significant interaction of hand and synchrony, F(1, 23) = 4.96, p < .05 
(see Figure 3).  Across induction types, there was a significant decrease in RT following 
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synchronous stimulation compared with asynchronous stimulation with left-hand responses (7 
ms), t(23) = 3.13., p < .01, but not with right-hand responses (-1 ms), t(23) = -.28, n.s. 
 Vocal Responses 
 In contrast to manual responses, there was no significant interaction between condition 
and synchrony, F(2, 38) = .46, n.s.  No significant differences between synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions were observed in the active (381 ms vs. 377 ms), t(19) = -0.89, passive 
(381 ms vs. 377 ms), t(19) = -0.74, or tactile (375 ms vs. 378 ms), t(19) = 0.37, conditions.  
Thus, the selective priming effect of agency observed with manual responses did not appear with 
vocal responses.  For each induction type, we compared the RT advantage for synchronous 
compared to asynchronous feedback between manual and vocal responses.  The synchrony 
advantage in the active condition we observed with manual responses was significantly reduced 
with vocal responses, t(42) = 2.59, p < .05 (Bonferroni corrected).  There was no effect of 
response effector on the difference between synchronous and asynchronous induction for the 
passive, t(42) = 0.69, n.s., or tactile, t(42) = 0.17, n.s., conditions.  Agency facilitation of RT may 
therefore reflect motor priming of hand responses, rather than facilitation of stimulus detection.  
Furthermore, the effector specificity of the effect eliminates the possibility that the effect of 
agency might result from non-specific attentional arousal. 
There was no significant interaction of synchrony and response hand, F(2, 38) = 0.04.  
Nor was there a significant difference between RT during synchronous and asynchronous blocks 
for either left hand (378 ms vs. 377 ms), t(19) = 0.11, or right hand (380 ms vs. 377 ms), t(19) = 
0.62, responses.  Thus, neither of the key effects observed with manual responses occurred with 
vocal responses, nor was there any trend in their direction. 
Discussion 
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 Subjective reports revealed that the sense of ownership over the hand emerged following 
synchronous, but not asynchronous, video feedback showing active movement, passive 
movement, and touch.  The sense of agency, in contrast, emerged only following synchronous 
feedback showing active movements.  This sense of agency was associated with a decrease in 
response time for manual – but not vocal – responses.  This effector specificity rules out the 
possibility that the effect of agency might be due to non-specific attentional arousal.  Thus, the 
sense of agency over a seen hand primes manual motor responses. 
Ownership and Agency as the Sensory and Motor Reflections of the Bodily Self 
The sense of ownership has sensory effects both on tactile stimuli (Longo et al in press), 
and on visual stimuli appearing on the hand (Whiteley et al 2008).  In the present experiment, 
however, no such effect was observed for visual stimuli which appeared near the hand.  Rather, 
in contrast to the sensory effects of the sense of ownership observed in those experiments, 
agency in the present experiment primed motor responses.  Thus, whereas the sense of ownership 
over a perceived hand influences sensory processing, the sense of agency influences motor 
processing.  Ownership and agency, then, can be thought of, respectively, as the sensory and 
motor reflections of the bodily self. 
Many studies examining the effects of seeing one’s hand have reported enhanced 
perceptual performance while viewing the hand compared to viewing some other non-hand 
object (e.g., Kennett et al 2001; Whiteley et al 2004).  One concern about this type of 
manipulation is that there are any number of low-level visual or attentional differences between 
the visual stimuli which may account for the observed differences.  For example, enhancement 
may arise because the hand is more interesting than the object, or because it is linked to the self. 
Indeed, Haggard (2006) found comparable visual enhancement of tactile acuity when 
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participants viewed an experimenter’s hand as when they viewed their own.  In the present study, 
the hand stimulus was identical across conditions during the RT task, namely a video image of 
the participant’s static hand.  Thus, the effects observed in the present experiment, which emerge 
in the synchronous conditions relative to the asynchronous conditions, cannot be due to the 
visual stimulus per se, but must result from the context provided by the previous induction 
period.  That is, the induction creates a tonic state consisting of the senses of ownership and 
agency, which in turn influences visuomotor reactions. 
Ownership and the Right Hemisphere 
While no overall effect of ownership was observed on motor responses, there was an 
interaction between ownership with hand laterality.  Ownership appeared to prime left-hand 
responses, but interfere with right-hand responses.  While this effect was unanticipated, it is 
consistent with several previous studies that have found a left-hand advantage for responding to 
self-related stimuli (e.g., Keenan et al 1999; Keenan et al 2001; Platek et al 2003).  Such effects 
suggests that the effect observed in the present experiment is not a specific effect of body 
ownership as such, but rather a generic effect of self-related stimuli.  Keenan and colleagues 
(Feinberg and Keenan 2005; Keenan et al 2001) suggest a general right-hemisphere bias for self-
related information, which reduces motor thresholds for the left hand.  Indeed, right-hemisphere 
biases have been observed in numerous neuroimaging studies examining such diverse self-
related stimuli as autobiographical memory (Craik et al 1999), self-face recognition (Sugiura et 
al 2000), self-voice recognition (Nakamura et al 2001), and the senses of body ownership 
(Tsakiris et al 2007) and agency (Ruby and Decety 2001; for review see Decety and Lamm 
2007). 
Tonic vs. Event-Based Agency 
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Up to now, we have discussed agency over the hand as a tonic background context, 
acquired during the induction period.  However, we also experience a more punctate sense of 
agency over particular actions, the sense that ‘I did that’.  This feeling is present when we make 
deliberate actions, but absent for involuntary movements, such as twitches.  In the present 
paradigm, the sense of agency over the hand is caused by repeated instances of self-generated 
movements with synchronous visual feedback, which are known to be perceived as self-caused 
(e.g., Blakemore et al 1999; Franck et al 2001).  Thus, repeated experience of transitory agency 
over individual actions creates a generalized and tonic sense of agency over the effector 
producing those actions.  The causes and the effect, however, appear to have rather different 
cognitive effects.  Event-based agency modulates the perceived timing of events.  The perceived 
time of stimuli caused by self-generated actions – but, again, not involuntary movements – is 
shifted towards the time of the movement (Haggard et al 2002), while the perceived time of the 
movement, in turn, is shifted towards the time of the effect.  Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that perceiving an action attributed to one’s own body may reduce the excitability of the motor 
system (Schütz-Bosbach et al 2006), an effect opposite that observed for tonic agency in this 
study.  Thus, there are cognitive effects both of tonic agency over an effector (as in the present 
study) and punctate agency over a specific action, though these effects are rather different. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Experimental setup. 
 
Figure 2: Subjective report data for ownership and agency.  Ownership scores reflect the mean 
response to questionnaire items 1-3 (items 2 and 3 scored in reverse); agency scores reflect the 
mean response to questionnaire items 4-6 (item 6 scored in reverse).  Error bars are one SEM. 
 
Figure 3: Induction-type by synchrony interaction.  Reaction time was selectively speeded 
following synchronously displayed active movements.  Error bars are one SEM. 
 
Figure 4: Effects of synchrony (difference in reaction time between asynchronous and 
synchronous conditions) by response hand and induction type.  Synchrony effects were larger for 
left-hand than for right-hand responses.  Error bars are one SEM. 
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